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IMPLIED PREEMPTION AND ITS EFFECT 
ON LOCAL HYDROFRACKING BANS IN 
NEW YORK 
David Giller* 
INTRODUCTION  
Depending on whom you ask, hydrofracking is either the 
future of American energy or an ecological disaster waiting to 
happen. Hydrofracking, otherwise known as “Fracking,”1 is a 
drilling process where underground rock formations are broken 
apart to extract natural gas.2 A number of environmental groups 
have questioned the safety of hydrofracking, alleging that it can 
damage the environment and that the resulting runoff wastewater 
can harm drinking water.3 Currently, there is a moratorium on 
hydrofracking in New York State4 until the Department of 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014; B.A., State University of 
New York at Geneseo, 2006. I would like to thank my friends and family for 
their unwavering support and encouragement, especially my parents and my 
sister for their insight and guidance. I also want to thank the entire staff of 
the Journal of Law and Policy for their diligence and help throughout the 
editing process as well as Professor Christopher Serkin for his invaluable 
assistance. 
1 See, e.g., Erica Levine Powers, Home Rule Meets State Regulation: 
Reflection on High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing for Natural Gas, A.B.A. 
ST. & LOC. L. NEWS, Winter 2012, at 1, 1 (2012). 
2 See Marcellus Shale, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) 
(providing overview of hydrofracking in New York State). 
3 See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water 
Hits Rivers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/02/27/us/27gas.html. 
4 See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41: Requiring Further Environmental 
Review (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/ 
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Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) completes an 
environmental impact review and creates new regulations.5 
While the DEC continues its review, a number of local 
municipalities in New York have enacted their own legal 
barriers to hydrofracking.6 These include both zoning bans on 
hydrofracking7 and moratoria against hydrofracking.8 While both 
zoning bans9 and moratoria10 have been challenged in court, this 
Note only addresses a town’s use of zoning power to ban 
hydrofracking.  
The New York State legislature11 has delegated to local 
municipalities the ability to “adopt, amend and repeal zoning 
regulations.”12 Local municipalities can use such zoning 
regulations to advance the public welfare, a power that has been 
“broadly construed.”13 However, when a municipality acts 
                                                          
paterson/executiveorders/EO41.html. 
5 See Mary Esch, New York Fracking Decision: Cuomo Under Pressure 
to Rule on Hydraulic Fracturing, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/06/new-york-fracking-decision_n_18 
62112.html.  
6 Id. 
7 Mary Esch, Driller to NY: Stop the Local Fracking Bans or We’ll Sue, 
PRESS CONNECTS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pressconnects.com/ 
viewart/20120731/NEWS10/307310030/Driller-NY-Stop-local-fracking-bans-
we-ll-sue. 
8 See Steve Reilly, Judge Overturns Binghamton Gas Drilling 
Moratorium, PRESS CONNECTS (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.press 
connects.com/article/20121002/NEWS11/310020090/Judge-overturns-
Binghamton-gas-drilling-moratorium (reporting that Binghamton’s moratorium 
was struck down for not meeting the necessary legal requirements).  
9 See id.; see also Dan Wiessner, New York Judge Upholds Fracking 
Ban in Towns, REUTERS (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/02/22/us-newyork-fracking-idUSTRE81L05820120222. 
10 Reilly, supra note 8.  
11 The term legislature when used in the remainder of the Note will refer 
to the New York State legislature. A reference to a local government will be 
expressly indicated.  
12 N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV’TS § 10(6) (McKinney 1994). 
13 Andrew Meyer, “Get the Frack Out of Town:” Preemption Challenges 
to Local Fracking Bans in New York, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. FIELD 
REPORTS (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/ 
articles/get-the-frack-out-of-town-preemption-challenges-to-local-fracking-
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outside of these delegated powers or “intrud[es] into an area of 
state authority,” such action will be considered preempted by 
state law either expressly or impliedly.14 Express preemption 
exists when the state, through specific language in legislation, 
reserves power for itself, superseding local municipal control.15 
Implied preemption, on the other hand, occurs where legislation 
does not explicitly give the state control over a local issue but 
insinuates that such control was intended by legislature.16 To find 
implied preemption, courts often examine “the nature of the 
subject matter regulated, the purpose and scope of the state 
legislative scheme, and the need for statewide uniformity.”17 
This usually involves examining the legislature’s intent at the 
time the law was created.18 However, such inquiries are 
problematic because courts are often reluctant to judge 
legislative intent.19  
New York case law is unclear regarding the criteria 
necessary for a finding of implied preemption. While the New 
York Court of Appeals has indicated that implied preemption 
can be inferred from state legislative policy or a comprehensive 
                                                          
bans-in-new-york. 
14 Shaun Goho, Municipalities and Hydraulic Fracturing: Trends in State 
Preemption, PLAN. & ENVTL. L., July 2012, at 3, 5 (2012); see also Michael 
E. Kenneally & Todd M. Mathes, Natural Gas Production and Municipal 
Home Rule in New York, N.Y. ZONING L. & PRAC. REP., Jan./Feb. 2010, at 
1, 3 (2010). 
15 See Goho, supra note 14, at 5; see also N.Y. COMM’N ON LOCAL 
GOV’T EFFICIENCY & COMPETITIVENESS, STRENGTHENING HOME RULE 
(2008), http://www.nyslocalgov.org/pdf/Strengthening_Home_Rule.pdf. 
16 See Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 14; see also Paul Weiland, 
Preemption of Local Efforts to Protect the Environment, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
467, 470 (1999). 
17 Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 14 (citing Albany Area Builders 
Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1989)). 
18 See, e.g., Goho, supra note 14, at 5; Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 
14, at 3; Weiland, supra note 16, at 470. 
19 See Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 14, at 5 (“[S]uch curtailment 
should only occur under a circumstance in which the legislature’s preemptive 
intent is absolutely clear.”); see also Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v. Town of 
Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234–35 (N.Y. 1996). 
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and detailed regulatory scheme,20 subsequent Court of Appeals 
decisions have retreated from such reasoning.21 This appears to 
be particularly true when courts examine a town’s use of zoning 
power.22 For example, in two recent trial court decisions, the 
trial courts upheld the town’s use of zoning power to ban 
hydrofracking.23 As part of those decisions, the courts found that 
the towns were not impliedly preempted24 under the Oil, Gas and 
Solution Mining Law (“OGSML”).25 These two decisions are the 
most recent illustrations of the current difficulty in showing 
implied preemption without an actual statement of intent by the 
legislature, especially with regard to zoning. 
This Note will examine the intersection of implied 
preemption in New York with local zoning laws and the 
hesitancy of New York courts to find such implied preemption. 
Despite the existence of implied preemption as a doctrine in 
New York jurisprudence, courts are unlikely to find it in fact. 
                                                          
20 See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 
487, 490 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that the local zoning laws could not prohibit a 
power plant because the legislature had pre-empted local regulation through 
its “comprehensive and detailed” regulatory scheme, Article VIII of the 
Public Service Law (now Article X of the Public Service Law)).  
21 See Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 
1987) (holding that the county could enact a law prohibiting sale of cesspool 
additives without approval by Suffolk County Commissioner since the 
legislature did not show a desire to preclude local regulation and the local 
legislation had the same motive as state legislation, safe drinking water); see 
also Vatore v. Comm’r of Consumer Affairs, 634 N.E.2d 958 (N.Y. 1994) 
(holding that a state statute regulating cigarette vending machines did not 
implicitly preempt New York City from creating more restrictive 
regulations).  
22 See Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., 583 N.E.2d 928 (N.Y. 1991) 
(holding that New York State Mental Hygiene Law did not implicitly preempt 
local zoning laws even though the state law included a detailed regulatory 
scheme). 
23 These cases are Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 
943 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 2012); Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of 
Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 2012). Both cases are being appealed to 
the Appellate Division and will be described in more detail later in the Note. 
24 Cooperstown, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 730; Anschutz, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 474. 
25 Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-
0303(2) (McKinney 2007).  
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Furthermore, because the incredibly high burden for finding 
implied preemption cannot be met in the current cases involving 
hydrofracking, the New York Court of Appeals26 should uphold 
the hydrofracking bans as a proper use of zoning power. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals should recognize the reality 
of implied preemption and its intersection with local zoning 
power. Namely, with regard to zoning, implied preemption 
should only be found when there is an explicit indication of 
legislative intent. A narrow approach to implied preemption with 
regard to zoning power is a better policy for New York because 
it eliminates the ambiguity of attempting to discern intent and 
forces the state legislature to consider the appropriate role of 
local zoning power.  
Part I of this Note describes the process of hydrofracking 
and the current controversy surrounding its use in both New 
York and other states. Part II examines the history of zoning and 
preemption in New York State with an analysis of previous New 
York cases involving mining and hydrofracking. Part III focuses 
on the narrow interpretation of what constitutes implied 
preemption by the New York Court of Appeals and how such an 
interpretation requires the Court of Appeals to uphold local 
hydrofracking bans. Ultimately, a narrow view of implied 
preemption with regard to zoning is the best policy to control 
hydrofracking in New York State and to promote deliberation 
and accountability in the state legislature. 
                                                          
26 At the time of publication, the Appellate Division has unanimously 
upheld the hydrofracking bans. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of 
Dryden, No. 515227 (N.Y. App. Div. May 2, 2013). However, 
hydrofracking ban opponents have indicated that they intend to seek leave to 
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Adam Briggle, Cities in New York Just Got a 
Big Stick in the Fracking Fight, SLATE (May 3, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/05/03/norse_energy_corp_v_to
wn_of_dryden_court_upholds_new_york_town_s_fracking.html. 
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I. HYDROFRACKING: ECONOMIC BOON OR TICKING TIME BOMB? 
A. Hydrofracking Background 
Although hydrofracking has been used by the natural gas 
industry for the past fifty years, it has only recently become 
popular.27 Its increased use is attributable to the growing 
desirability of natural gas for environmental and economic 
reasons, the discovery of large gas reserves within the United 
States, a desire to create homegrown energy opportunities, and 
new advancements in the process of hydrofracking.28 While 
scientists have known for years that certain shale formations 
possessed high quantities of natural gas, it is recent 
technological advancements that have opened up these shale 
formations to drilling.29 One such shale formation is the 
Marcellus Shale, which runs underground from Ohio through 
northeast Virginia into Pennsylvania and southern New York.30 
Although it is unclear how much natural gas is recoverable from 
the New York portion, some estimate as much as 489 trillion 
cubic feet (“TCF”) of natural gas exist throughout the entire 
shale.31 To put this into perspective, the United States’ current 
annual rate of gas consumption is only 25.5 TCF.32 Gas from 
shale production alone could provide for practically all domestic 
natural gas demand with surplus gas that could be exported.33  
                                                          
27 Goho, supra note 14, at 3. 
28 Id. 
29 Marianne Lavelle, Forcing Gas Out of Rock with Water, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ 
news/2010/10/101022-energy-marcellus-shale-gas-science-technology-water/. 
30 Marcellus Shale, supra note 2. 
31 Id. 
32 Natural Gas Consumption by End Use, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2013). 
33 What is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/about_shale_gas.cfm 
(last updated Dec. 5, 2012). 
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For years, scientists knew of the Marcellus Shale’s potential 
but were unable to harness the natural gas that lay underneath.34 
However, that changed with new technological improvements in 
the process of hydrofracking.35 In early 2003, a geologist 
working for a gas company in Pennsylvania learned of a new 
“fracking” process pioneered by oilmen in Texas.36 It relied 
more on water, and, while originally developed to save money, 
it had the added benefit of being able to fracture shale more 
effectively.37 Larger companies saw the advantage of this new 
hydrofracking technique and began to combine it with another 
method known as horizontal drilling.38 In horizontal drilling, a 
well is drilled from the surface to just above the gas reservoir 
where it is “curve[d] to intersect the reservoir . . . with a near-
horizontal inclination” maximizing the amount of natural gas 
available.39 These advancements gave companies the ability to 
drill and extract natural gas from areas such as the Marcellus 
Shale, once considered unreachable.40 
The process of hydrofracking consists of “pumping an 
engineered fluid system and a propping agent (proppant) such as 
sand”41 along with other chemicals into a well to break up 
underground rock formations to allow for the easier extraction 
of natural gas.42 The fluid involved in hydrofracking often 
contains compounds such as biocide43 to prevent bacteria growth 
                                                          
34 Lavelle, supra note 29. 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 See id. 
39 Lynn Helms, Horizontal Drilling, 35 DMR NEWSL., no. 1, at 1, 1 
(Jan. 2008), available at https://www.dmr.nd.gov/ndgs/newsletter/NL0308/ 
pdfs/Horizontal.pdf. 
40 See Marcellus Shale, supra note 2. 
41 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., REVISED DRAFT 
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, 
GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 1-1 (2011) [hereinafter 
RDSGIS], available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf. 
42 See Marcellus Shale, supra note 2.  
43 RDSGIS, supra note 41, at 5-50 tbl.5.6 (explaining that biocide is an 
additive that “[i]nhibits growth of organisms that could produce gases 
(particularly hydrogen sulfide) that could contaminate methane gas [and] 
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and other agents to ensure the proppant remains in the fracture 
of the shale instead of corroding the pipes carrying the water 
into the fracture.44 Hydrofracking is also accompanied by a 
drilling rig45 and requires the instillation of storage and 
processing centers nearby.46 Once the hydrofracking process is 
completed, the remaining fluid, known as “flowback,” returns to 
the surface.47 If the “flowback” is not reused, then it is 
considered “industrial wastewater” and must be disposed of in a 
concentrated and safe manner.48 
Supporters and opponents of hydrofracking dispute whether 
the benefits outweigh the risks. One benefit of hydrofracking, its 
supporters argue, is increased revenue and jobs. Proponents 
point to Pennsylvania, where more than 5,000 hydrofracking 
wells have been created since 2005.49 According to the 
Pennsylvania State Department of Labor and Industry, in 2010 
almost 19,000 people were employed in the hydrofracking 
industry with another 140,000 working in related or supporting 
jobs.50 Additionally, the Marcellus Shale Coalition estimates that 
hydrofracking generated $11.2 billion in economic activity and 
$1.1 billion in state and local tax revenue for Pennsylvania in 
2010 alone.51 An industry study indicated that this could be just 
the beginning and that gas companies could generate as much as 
                                                          
prevents the growth of bacteria which can reduce the ability of the fluid to 
carry proppant into the fracture”). 
44 See Marcellus Shale, supra note 2. 
45 RDSGIS, supra note 41, at 5-135–36 tbl.5.29 (explaining that the 
drilling rig consists of a drill pad, drill rig, drilling fluid and materials, road 
construction equipment and drilling equipment such as the casing and drill 
pipe). 
46 Id. at 5-80–82.  
47 Id. at 5-99–117.  
48 Id. at 5-130. 
49 Goho, supra note 14, at 5. 
50 Laura Legere, Industry Study: Marcellus Economic Impact Dramatic, 
CITIZENSVOICE.COM (July 11, 2011), http://citizensvoice.com/news/ 
drilling/industry-study-marcellus-economic-impact-dramatic-1.1178179. 
51 TIMOTHY J. CONSIDINE ET AL., THE PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS 
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: STATUS, ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND FUTURE 
POTENTIAL iv (2011), available at http://marcelluscoalition.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Final-2011-PA-Marcellus-Economic-Impacts.pdf. 
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$2.6 billion in additional state and local tax revenue in 2011 and 
2012.52 However, it is unclear how many of the new jobs being 
created are going to Pennsylvania residents.53 In 2008, the 
Pennsylvania College of Technology indicated that between 
seventy to eighty percent of the actual drill workers were not 
from Pennsylvania.54 Such reports have led to doubts about 
whether hydrofracking is actually an effective source of revenue 
or jobs.55  
The economic benefit for New York in particular remains 
unclear. Some economists estimate that hydrofracking would 
bring over 17,000 new construction jobs and almost 30,000 
indirect jobs to New York.56 Furthermore, it is predicted that 
hydrofracking would cause New York’s personal income tax 
revenue to increase anywhere from $31 million to $125 million 
a year.57 Landowners willing to lease or sell their land would 
also benefit economically. In Pennsylvania, gas companies are 
paying over $1,000 per acre, plus royalties, to landowners to 
drill on their land.58 Both the jobs and the drilling leases would 
benefit some of the poorest areas of New York State where jobs 
have been hard to find.59  
Opponents of hydrofracking challenge the reliability of 
reports promoting the economic benefits, the prospect of viable 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 See TOM WILBER, UNDER THE SURFACE: FRACKING FORTUNES AND 
THE FATE OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE 102 (2012) (noting the trend in out-of-
state workers employed at Pennsylvania drilling rigs). 
54 Id.  
55 See Jannette M. Barth, Hydrofracking Offers Short-Term Boom, Long-
Term Bust, ENR NEW YORK (Mar. 7, 2011), http://newyork.construction.com/ 
opinions/viewpoint/2011/0307_HydrofrackingOffers.asp (discussing studies 
that have found that any positive economic impact from hydrofracking only 
occurs in the short-term).  
56 Joan Gralla, Economists Clash on Jobs Fracking Brings to NY, 
REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/30/us-
natgas-fracking-newyork-idUSBRE83T0EH20120430. 
57 Id. 
58 Steven Kastenbaum, Fracking in New York: Risk vs. Reward, CNN 
(May 2, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/09/us/new-york-
fracking/index.html. 
59 See id. 
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long term growth from hydrofracking, and the danger posed to 
tourism and agriculture. Some academics and economists have 
disputed recent reports about the economic benefits of 
hydrofracking.60 Specifically, the accuracy of a recent 
Pennsylvania State University study in favor of hydrofracking 
has been called into question by reports that its funding came 
from oil and gas companies.61 Other experts and scholars dispute 
the number of jobs that would actually be created due to the 
“capital intensive” nature of hydrofracking.62 There are also 
concerns over whether any job creation would be sustainable 
over the long term.63 In addition, many landowners are nervous 
about hydrofracking’s effect on New York’s large agricultural64 
and wine businesses.65 Damage to farmland could lead to an 
increase in milk prices.66 Furthermore, increased ozone 
emissions from hydrofracking could negatively affect soy and 
grape production.67 Vineyard owners, some of whom are on the 
northern fringe of the Marcellus Shale, are concerned about 
                                                          
60 Jim Efstahiou Jr., Penn State Faculty Snub of Fracking Study Ends 
Research, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
print/2012-10-03/penn-state-faculty-snub-of-fracking-study-ends-research.html 
(reporting that a recent hydrofracking study at Pennsylvania State University 
study was canceled after criticism from faculty members that the report was 
biased in favor of the hydrofracking industry).  
61 Id. 
62 Carolyn Krupski, Experts Debate Effects of Fracking on New York 
State Economy, Environment, CORNELL DAILY SUN (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://cornellsun.com/node/54307 (noting that since hydrofracking is capital-
intensive, jobs are often only associated with the construction of the wells, 
and once the wells are complete there is often less need for labor).  
63 See id.  
64 See id. (describing the danger posed to New York’s agricultural 
commodities from hydrofracking based on the effect of hydrofracking in 
Pennsylvania and possible increased ozone emissions). 
65 See Michael Hill, Wine and Fracking Don’t Mix, Say Vineyard 
Owners, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 23, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/ 
article/wine-and-fracking-dont-mix-say-vineyard-owners (noting the fears of 
upstate N.Y. vineyard owners that hydrofracking will negatively impact their 
businesses).  
66 See Krupski, supra note 62 (noting the negative impact of 
hydrofracking on agriculture and milk prices in Pennsylvania).  
67 Id. 
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possible damage to their vineyard and the perception of damage 
by customers.68 Additionally, any damage to New York’s 
landscape from hydrofracking could negatively affect tourism, 
which in 2010 was a $6.5 billion engine for New York State.69 
There is also considerable fear that hydrofracking will cause 
serious environmental damage. This fear is shared by a diverse 
group of residents and environmentalists from all over New 
York State.70 Opponents of hydrofracking point to the 
environmental issues currently facing Pennsylvania.71 For 
example, there are reports in Pennsylvania that natural gas 
drillers are disposing of wastewater in rivers that supply 
drinking water.72 Environmentalists are afraid that the chemicals 
used in creating the hydrofracking fluid and which are present in 
the wastewater could be dangerous if added to drinking water.73 
There is apprehension about the specific nature of the chemicals 
used in hydrofracking, since they are currently not disclosed to 
the public.74  
                                                          
68 See Hill, supra note 65 (discussing the possible damage to vineyards 
from hydrofracking and the “public relations nightmare” of having 
hydrofracking near vineyards). 
69 Gralla, supra note 56 (noting that hydrofracking could lead to 
“unsightly rigs and possibly scarred landscapes”).  
70 See Members, NEW YORKERS AGAINST FRACKING, 
http://nyagainstfracking.org/members/ (last visited Feb. 5 2013) (listing 
members of Advisory Committee); Groups Rally to Prevent Fracking in NY, 
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Jan. 11, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.crainsnew 
york.com/article/20130111/ECONOMY/130119976 (describing efforts of 
antifracking groups from “New York City to Buffalo”). 
71 See generally David B. Caruso, ‘Fracking’ Wastewater Still a Problem 
in Pennsylvania, NBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2011, 6:35 PM), http://www. 
msnbc.msn.com/id/41858136/ns/us_news-environment/t/fracking-wastewater-
still-problem-pennsylvania/ (detailing the harm caused in Pennsylvania by 
hydrofracking wastewater); Urbina, supra note 3 (noting the environmental 
concerns surrounding Pennsylvania hydrofracking).  
72 Caruso, supra note 71. 
73 See Caruso, supra note 71; see also Urbina, supra note 3. 
74 See Kate Galbraith, Seeking Disclosure on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/business/energy-
environment/seeking-disclosure-on-fracking.html (pointing out that while 
individual states have different disclosure requirements they generally contain 
a “trade secrets” provision that prevents public disclosure of certain 
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Although natural gas executives often claim that 
hydrofracking is not responsible for contaminated underground 
drinking water,75 recent reports have linked tainted water wells 
in Pennsylvania to hydrofracking from the Marcellus Shale.76 
These reports indicate that some of the tainted water contained 
high amounts of methane, double the Pennsylvania state safety 
level.77 Methane is dangerous because while it does not affect the 
smell or taste of the water, it can render the water explosive.78 
Methane can also migrate from a faulty well to an enclosed area 
where it is difficult to notice.79 Pennsylvania residents nearby 
hydrofracking operations have reported exploding wells and 
homes being destroyed from methane buildup.80 Additionally, 
residents who live nearby such operations contend that their well 
water has become undrinkable.81 Contaminated well water could 
result from hydrofracking itself,82 “shoddy drilling practices, 
accidents and poor oversight,”83 or natural migration.84 
Environmentalists in New York State echo the concerns of 
Pennsylvania residents.85 New York environmentalists worry that 
                                                          
chemicals that fracking companies consider proprietary material).  
75 Ian Urbina, A Tainted Water Well, and Concern There May Be More, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/us/ 
04natgas.html. 
76 Mark Drakem & Jim Efstahiou Jr., Cabot’s Methodology Links 
Tainted Water Wells to Gas Fracking, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2012 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-02/cabot-s-methodology-links-
tainted-water-wells-to-gas-fracking.html. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.; see also Mark Drajem, High Methane in Pennsylvania Water 
Deemed Safe by EPA, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2012-03-29/high-methane-in-pennsylvania-water-deemed-safe-by-
epa.html (noting that high amounts of Methane in water can become 
explosive, even when the water itself is not unsafe to drink according to the 
EPA). 
79 WILBER, supra note 53, at 89–92. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 133–38.  
82 See Drakem & Efstahiou Jr., supra note 76. 
83 Kastenbaum, supra note 58. 
84 See id.  
85 Id.  
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hydrofracking could not only affect local landowners’ drinking 
water but also New York City drinking water.86 Hydrofracking 
could negatively affect the watersheds in the Catskills, an area 
that provides much of New York City’s drinking water.87  
The environmental dangers from hydrofracking combined 
with the economic potential have galvanized both supporters and 
detractors in New York State.88 What was once an unremarked 
and unknown drilling technique has become a statewide issue.89 
A recent protest against hydrofracking had 3,000 individuals in 
attendance90 and over 200,000 comments have been submitted to 
the DEC both in support and against hydrofracking.91  
B. Fracking in New York State  
In December of 2010, Governor David Paterson introduced a 
moratorium on hydrofracking in New York State.92 The 
moratorium will continue until the DEC completes an 
environmental review, including a public comment period,93 and 
                                                          
86 Id. 
87 See id. 
88 See Thomas Kaplan, Millions Spent in Albany Fight to Drill for Gas, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/ 
nyregion/hydrofracking-debate-spurs-huge-spending-by-industry.html; see also 
Alan Chartock, Anti-Frackers Get Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s Attention, DAILY 
FREEMAN (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.dailyfreeman.com/articles/2012/09/ 
30/opinion/doc506061d0150a2528440730.txt. 
89 See Goho, supra note 14, at 3 (“Fracking is not a new process; it has 
been in use for more than 50 years. But the scale and scope have expanded 
significantly in the last decade.”); see also Celebrities Lead Crowd of 3,000 
in Albany Protesting Hydraulic Fracking, CBS NEW YORK (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/01/23/celebrities-lead-crowd-of-3000-in-
albany-protesting-hydraulic-fracturing/. 
90  Celebrities Lead Crowd of 3,000 in Albany Protesting Hydraulic 
Fracking, supra note 89. 
91 Groups Rally to Prevent Fracking in NY, supra note 70; New Yorkers 
Deliver Unprecedented 200k+ Comments on Cuomo’s Fracking Rules, 
ECOWATCH (Jan. 11, 2013), http://ecowatch.com/2013/comments-ny-
fracking-rules/. 
92 See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41, supra note 4.  
93 Groups Rally to Prevent Fracking in NY, supra note 70. 
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crafts regulations regarding hydrofracking.94 The DEC 
introduced a preliminary impact statement in 2011, but it is 
unclear when a final plan will be complete.95 During the first 
comment period, the DEC received over 65,000 comments on 
the proposed regulations,96 a previously record-setting number.97 
The DEC then had until December of 2012 to incorporate those 
comments and complete its proposed hydrofracking regulations.98 
However, before the proposed regulations were due, the DEC 
directed the state Health Department to begin a health 
assessment of hydrofracking, delaying the final decision.99 The 
DEC then filed for a ninety day extension by submitting a 
revised set of DEC regulations and opening up the process for 
another thirty days of comment ending January 11, 2013.100 This 
recent comment period elicited an “unprecedented” number of 
comments, over 200,000.101 The DEC missed their recent March 
deadline for promulgating hydrofracking regulations, and now 
any new regulations will be subject to another forty-five-day 
comment period and additional public hearings.102  
                                                          
94 See Esch, supra note 5. 
95 Rick Karlin, Is Trial Balloon Full of Shale Gas?, ALBANY TIMES 
UNION (June 13, 2012), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Is-trial-
balloon-full-of-shale-gas-3632650.php. 
96 Kastenbaum, supra note 58. 
97 New Yorkers Deliver Unprecedented 200k+ Comments on Cuomo’s 
Fracking Rules, supra note 91.  
98 Jon Campbell, New Hydrofracking Comment Period Begins Dec. 12, 
ITHACA J. (Nov. 29, 2012, 9:56 PM), http://www.theithacajournal.com/ 
article/20121129/NEWS11/311290097/New-hydrofracking-comment-period-
begins-Dec-12. 
99 Jacob Gersman, Pressure Rises for Decision on Drilling, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443389604 
578024851639481218.html. 
100 Campbell, supra note 98.  
101 Groups Rally to Prevent Fracking in NY, supra note 70; New Yorkers 
Deliver Unprecedented 200k+ Comments on Cuomo’s Fracking Rules, supra 
note 91. 
102 Fracking Deadline Passes; Health Impact Study Sought, 
STEUBENCOURIER.COM (Mar. 5, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.steuben 
courier.com/news/x846064007/Fracking-deadline-passes-health-impact-study-
sought. 
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While the final plan is still being developed by the DEC, an 
unofficial report from the DEC’s office indicated that 
hydrofracking would be limited to Chemung, Chenango, 
Steuben, Tioga and Broome counties.103 Additionally, 
development would be limited to willing communities with an 
initial cap of fifty wells statewide.104 The Governor neither 
confirmed nor denied the report.105 However, the Governor did 
say that he believed that home rule should be taken into 
consideration.106 Such reports have been described as a “trial 
balloon” to possibly appease both hydrofracking proponents and 
critics.107 
Hydrofracking has both powerful supporters and opponents. 
Supporters of hydrofracking include some of the largest gas and 
energy companies. For instance, Exxon Mobile plans to invest 
$185 billion over five years to develop new sources of oil and 
gas.108 Pro-fracking advocates also employ an army of lobbyists 
and industry spokespeople with the goal of bringing 
hydrofracking to New York.109 Those opposed to hydrofracking 
consist of grass roots activists, conservation groups and notable 
celebrities.110 While hydrofracking opponents aim to protect the 
                                                          
103 Danny Hakim, Cuomo Proposal Would Restrict Gas Drilling to a 
Struggling Area, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/06/14/nyregion/hydrofracking-under-cuomo-plan-would-be-restricted-to-
a-few-counties.html 
104 Id. 
105 Karlin, supra note 95.  
106 Jorteh Senah & Karen DeWitt, Cuomo Offers Some Support for 
Limited Fracking, WNYC (July 10, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/ 
articles/wnyc-news/2012/jul/10/calls-independent-review-fracking-state-set-
unveil-plan-summer/. 
107 Karlin, supra note 95; see also Senah & DeWitt, supra note 106.  
108 Brian O’Keefe, Exxon’s Big Bet on Shale Gas, CNNMONEY (Apr. 16, 
2012, 5:00 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/04/16/exxon-shale-gas-
fracking/. 
109 See Kaplan, supra note 88 (noting that in 2011 companies that drill 
for natural gas spent more than $3.2 million lobbying the state). 
110 See Peter Applebome, Drilling Critics Face a Divide Over the Goal of 
Their Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/01/10/nyregion/gas-drilling-critics-in-new-york-face-a-divide-over-their-
goal.html; Chartock, supra note 88. 
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environment, there is disagreement over the best way to do that, 
such as a statewide ban or stringent hydrofracking regulations.111  
Hydrofracking has also become an important political issue. 
Elected officials from both parties and different levels of 
government have taken a position on hydrofracking.112 In recent 
New York State elections, both local and federal candidates have 
focused on the role of hydrofracking.113 These have been hard 
fought campaigns with resources and volunteers on both sides.114 
Although in the last few years antifracking activists have become 
more pronounced in New York State,115 recent election results 
included notable victories for pro-fracking candidates.116 One 
such victory was Debbie Preston’s successful campaign for 
Broome County executive against an outspoken antifracking 
activist.117  
In the meantime, towns have been taking their own steps, 
with some passing resolutions in favor of hydrofracking118 and 
others amending their laws to ban hydrofracking within their 
borders.119 Currently, over fifty towns have passed resolutions in 
favor of hydrofracking.120 Those towns in favor are mostly 
                                                          
111 See Applebome, supra note 110. 
112 See Steve Reilly, Hydrofracking: It Has Polarized Voters and May 
Decide the Election, PRESSCONNECTS.COM (Sept. 29, 2012, 9:06 PM), 
http://www.pressconnects.com/article/20120929/NEWS11/309290033/Hydrof
racking-has-polarized-voters-may-decide-election. 
113 See id. 
114 Id.  
115 Ellen Cantarow, The Secret War of Anti-Fracking Activists, 
MOTHERJONES (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/ 
2012/11/fracking-new-york-cuomo. 
116 Mary Esch, NY Anti-Fracking Candidates Fared Poorly at Polls, BUS. 
WK. (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-11-08/ny-anti-
fracking-candidates-fared-poorly-at-polls. 
117 Id. 
118 See Memorandum from the Joint Landowners Coal. of N.Y., Inc. to 
N.Y. Local Officials (June 28, 2012) available at http://www.jlcny.org/ 
site/attachments/article/1348/JLC%20-20Resolution%20Cover%20Memo.pdf. 
119 See David Slottje & Helen Holden Slottje, A Legal Plan to Control 
Drilling, SIERRA ATLANTIC (Sierra Club Atl. Chapter, Albany, N.Y.), Spring 
2011, available at http://newyork.sierraclub.org/SA/Vol41/Legal_plan.htm.  
120 Map of Town Resolutions in Support of Hydrofracking, JOINT 
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located in the southern tier near the Pennsylvania border, the 
richest area of the Marcellus Shale.121 Due to the state 
moratorium, there is currently no hydrofracking in New York;122 
therefore the pro-fracking resolutions have no legal authority. 
However, they are a symbolic indication of support for 
hydrofracking.123 Sometimes the resolutions specify their support 
for the DEC to have the final say on hydrofracking, rather than 
local municipalities.124 These resolutions are intended to combat 
local hydrofracking bans and illustrate that there is substantial 
support for bringing hydrofracking to New York.125  
Municipalities who oppose hydrofracking have used a variety 
of legal tactics to ban hydrofracking either in part or entirely.126 
So far, over fifty upstate municipalities have used their zoning 
power to ban hydrofracking and over one hundred have enacted 
their own moratoria.127 Most of the municipalities that have 
passed bans are in central and western New York.128 These areas 
tend to possess less natural gas than those areas closer to 
Pennsylvania, leading some hydrofracking supporters to question 
their motives.129 However, some of the hydrofracking bans are in 
areas along the natural gas rich area of the Marcellus Shale.130 
                                                          
LANDOWNERS COAL. OF N.Y., INC., http://www.jlcny.org/site/attachments/ 
article/1349/JLCNY%20NYS%20Map%208.7.12.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 
2012). 
121 Id.; see also Matt Richmond, Resolutions Supporting DEC’s Fracking 
Decision Spread, INNOVATION TRAIL (July 13, 2012), http://innovationtrail.org/ 
post/resolutions-supporting-decs-fracking-decision-spread. 
122 See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41, supra note 4. 
123 See Joint Landowners Coal. of N.Y., Inc., supra note 118. 
124 See Richmond, supra note 121.  
125 See id.  
126 Goho, supra note 14, at 4. 
127 Current High Volume Horizontal Hydraulic Fracturing Drilling Bans 
and Moratoria in NY State, FRAC TRACKER (Mar. 16, 2013), 
http://www.fractracker.org/maps/ny-moratoria/. 
128 See Joseph de Avila, Fracking’ Goes Local, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 
2012, 12:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444327204 
577617793552508470.html; see also Joint Landowners Coal. of N.Y., Inc., 
supra note 118. 
129 See Richmond, supra note 121; see also de Avila, supra note 128. 
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Two local hydrofracking bans have been challenged in court.131 
Both were upheld at the trial court level and both were heard on 
appeal before the Appellate Division, Third Department on 
March 21, 2013.132 The Appellate Division unanimously upheld 
the hydrofracking bans as a proper use of town zoning power, 
although hydrofracking proponents have indicated that they plan 
to appeal.133  
With the moratorium against hydrofracking still in place and 
an ever-changing deadline for the DEC,134 passions run high for 
both supporters and opponents of hydrofracking. Their battle has 
taken place in the street,135 over the airwaves136 and at the ballot 
box.137 Now with the advent of hydrofracking bans all over New 
York State, it appears that the courts are the next major battle 
ground. 
C. Fracking Legal Regulatory Structure in Other States 
While hydrofracking is still in its infancy in New York, it 
has been employed for some time in a number of surrounding 
states with legal battles already underway.138 Pennsylvania was 
                                                          
and Moratoria in NY State, supra note 127.  
131 Dan Wiessner, New York Fracking Ban in Towns Upheld by Second 
Judge, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24 2012, 7:55 PM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2012/02/25/new-york-fracking-ban_n_1300600.html. 
132 Jon Campbell, Appeals Heard on Dryden, Middlefield Fracking Bans, 
ITHACAJOURNAL.COM (Mar. 21, 2013, 7:24 PM), http://www.theithaca 
journal.com/article/20130321/NEWS01/303210042/Appeals-heard-Dryden-
Middlefield-fracking-bans. 
133 Jon Campbell, Appeals Court: N.Y. Towns Can Ban Hydrofracking, 
LOHUD.COM (May 22, 2013), http://www.lohud.com/article/20130502/ 
NEWS/305020063/Appeals-court-N-Y-towns-can-ban-hydrofracking. 
134 See Esch, supra note 5. 
135 Celebrities Lead Crowd of 3,000 in Albany Protesting Hydraulic 
Fracking, supra note 89. 
136 See Kaplan, supra note 88.  
137 Reilly, supra note 112.  
138 See generally Francis Grandijan, State Regulations, Litigation, and 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 7 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 47 (2012) 
(detailing the regulatory structure and history of hydraulic fracturing); see 
also Goho, supra note 14, at 6. 
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one of the first states to be part of the gas rush with companies 
leasing land from landowners for hydrofracking as early as 
2007.139 From 2008 to 2010 the number of permit applications 
increased from 478 to 3,314.140 The permit application is 
supposed to involve a detailed evaluation of water intake and the 
process for discharging wastewater for that specific drilling 
site.141 However, due to the overwhelming number of permits, 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) 
officials have not been able to properly screen them.142 This has 
led to an approval rate of over 99.5%.143 While Pennsylvania 
does have general legislation to protect water supplies,144 many 
citizens are concerned that there is no appropriate oversight of 
the hydrofracking industry.145 Reports of exploding wells, 
contaminated groundwater, and destruction of nearby property 
have only increased those fears.146  
Concerns with the state regulatory process have led a 
number of Pennsylvania towns to enact their own laws 
controlling where hydrofracking may take place.147 In 2009, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that local municipalities have 
the ability to “control the location of wells consistent with 
established zoning principles.”148 Such authority was pursuant to 
the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act which expressly preempted 
any laws regarding the specific operation of hydrofracking.149 
The Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act did, however, allow 
                                                          
139 See WILBER, supra note 53, at 17. 
140 Id. at 80. 
141 Grandijan, supra note 138, at 74.  
142 See WILBER, supra note 53, at 81. 
143 Id. 
144 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3218 (2012) (mandating protection of well 
water and holding companies liable for replacing any water that they 
damage). 
145 See WILBER, supra note 53, at 80–82.  
146 See id. at 89–142. 
147 See Goho, supra note 14, at 6.  
148 Range Res.-Appalachia LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa. 
2009). 
149 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2012). 
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municipalities to ban drilling in residential areas.150 Some 
municipalities in Pennsylvania though have gone further and 
banned hydrofracking entirely.151 While Pennsylvania courts have 
ruled that towns can control the location of hydrofracking 
drilling sites, the legality of zoning bans under the Pennsylvania 
Oil and Gas Act are uncertain.152  
In response to the court’s support of local zoning power to 
control the location of hydrofracking sites, the Pennsylvania 
legislature enacted Act 13, amending the Oil and Gas Act, to 
allow hydrofracking in all zoning districts, even residential 
ones.153 Act 13 also invalidated all existing ordinances involving 
hydrofracking.154 However, a Pennsylvania Appellate Court 
recently struck down Act 13.155 The court ruled that its 
provisions were unconstitutional in that they took too much 
power from local government to regulate their own 
communities.156 That ruling is being appealed to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.157 In addition, the Public Utility Commission 
determined that Pittsburgh’s ban on hydrofracking was not 
allowed under state law.158 However, this is only a 
                                                          
150 Id. 
151 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Bans Hydrofracking, BAY RIDGE JOURNAL (Dec. 
1, 2010), http://www.bayridgejournal.blogspot.com/2010/12/pittsburgh-bans-
hydrofracking.html; Hydrofracking Bans and Moratoria, SIERRA CLUB 
ACTIVIST NETWORK (May 26, 2011), http://bit.ly/14fIwV9 (listing bans and 
moratoria in Pennsylvania).  
152 See Goho, supra note 14, at 6. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Editorial, Towns Win a Round in Court Against Unfettered Fracking, 
PHILLY.COM (Aug. 1, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-08-01/news/ 
32962407_1_buildings-and-water-wells-impact-fees-environmental-hazards. 
156 Marc Levy, Pennsylvania Act 13 Provisions Struck Down by Appellate 
Court, HUFFINGTON POST (July 26, 2012, 2:19 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/26/pennsylvania-act-13-natural-
gas_n_1706822.html. 
157 Scott Detrow, Corbett Administration Files Act 13 Appeal With State 
Supreme Court, STATEIMPACT (July 27, 2012, 4:53 PM), http://stateimpact. 
npr.org/pennsylvania/2012/07/27/corbett-administration-files-act-13-appeal-
with-state-supreme-court/.  
158 Laura Olson & Joe Smydo, PUC Says Pittsburgh’s Ban on Natural 
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recommendation and relies on Act 13.159 It is unclear whether 
Pittsburgh will revise its hydrofracking ban.160 As challenges to 
Act 13 continue to move through Pennsylvania courts, it remains 
unsettled whether towns in Pennsylvania will ultimately be able 
to control the location of hydrofracking through their zoning 
power. 
West Virginia was also confronted with the issue of 
preemption with regard to hydrofracking when a number of its 
local municipalities passed zoning laws banning hydrofracking.161 
However, West Virginia’s Monongalia County Circuit Court 
struck down a ban passed by Morgantown162 that prohibited 
“[d]rilling a well for the purpose of extracting or storing oil or 
gas using horizontal drilling with fracturing or fracking 
methods.”163 The court ruled that the West Virginia Oil and Gas 
Act164 fully “occupied the field,” rendering the local ban 
invalid.165 The court further found that the Oil and Gas Act 
indicated an intention for regulatory authority to be at the state 
                                                          
Gas Extraction Conflicts with State Law, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 
11, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/puc-
says-pittsburghs-ban-on-natural-gas-extraction-conflicts-with-state-law-
652858/.  
159 Id. 
160 Levy, supra note 156; see also Abby W. Schachter, Pittsburgh 
Rethinks Fracking Ban, N.Y. POST (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.nypost.com/ 
p/blogs/capitol/pittsburgh_rethinks_fracking_ban_QoyPPTO8iYQNEs5BTQpt
eO (reporting that a Pittsburgh councilman has “proposed legislation to 
eliminate the current ban and replace it instead with strict zoning regulations 
for gas extraction”). 
161 Goho, supra note 14, at 6. 
162 Adam Orford, Local Bans on Hydraulic Fracturing Upheld in New 
York State, Struck Down in West Virginia, MARTEN L. NEWS (Apr. 10, 
2012), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20120410-local-hydraulic-
fracturing-bans. 
163 Goho, supra note 14, at 6. (quoting An Ordinance Repealing Article 
721 of the City of Morgantown’s Business and Taxation Code (Morgantown, 
W. Va. 2011), available at http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/ 
doc/Frack_Actions_MorgantownWV-ban.pdf). 
164 West Virginia Oil and Gas Act, W. VA. CODE § 22-6-1 to -41 (West 
2011). 
165 Orford, supra note 162.  
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level.166 The court discerned such an intention by looking to the 
language and rules promulgated by the West Virginia DEP 
which gave the state ultimate responsibility for protecting the 
environment and indicated a “comprehensive framework.”167 
Additionally, the court held that West Virginia’s municipality’s 
powers are “narrowly proscribed” and that if there is a question 
as to whether a municipality has certain legislative power, the 
court should find that the municipality does not possess such 
power.168 Morgantown did not appeal and other municipalities 
have since repealed their hydrofracking bans.169 Recently, 
Morgantown considered limited zoning laws, controlling the 
location of hydrofracking rather than an outright ban, although it 
is unclear if even such a limited ban would be allowed.170 Until 
appellate courts in West Virginia address the level of power 
local municipalities possess through their zoning power, it seems 
unlikely that any type of hydrofracking ban will be allowed.  
The states surrounding New York, where hydrofracking 
already exists, have all taken different approaches to local 
zoning power and hydrofracking bans. Generally the courts and 
legislature have been more restrictive of local power with 
greater control given to the state.171 However, the law in both 
West Virginia and Pennsylvania is still unsettled, with the 
validity of Act 13 pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court172 and the West Virginia bans only being struck down at 
the trial level.173  
                                                          
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
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169 Goho, supra note 14, at 6–7. 
170 See Goho, supra note 14, at 6–7; Orford, supra note 162. 
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II. ZONING AND PREEMPTION IN NEW YORK STATE 
A. History of Local Government and Zoning  
New York State consists of a myriad of different levels of 
local government, some existing for hundreds of years and 
tracing their existence to the establishment of the New York 
State Constitution in 1777.174 The different levels of local 
government include county, city, town, and village 
governments.175 The New York Constitution only confers 
legislative power to the New York State legislature as opposed 
to individual municipalities.176 This gives the state the authority 
to “enact laws which regulate, prohibit, or require certain 
conduct, provided that such laws have some reasonable relation 
to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.”177 Such broad 
power gives state legislatures the initial authority to impose land 
use restrictions.178 While there are some statewide land use 
ordinances, such as fire laws, land use regulation is often left to 
local municipalities.179 The rationale, as expressed by the Court 
of Appeals, is that towns are in the best position to evaluate 
community needs and use their zoning power accordingly.180  
                                                          
174 See N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK 59 
(2011) [hereinafter LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK], available at 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Local_Government_Handbook.pdf.  
175 Id. at 29. 
176 N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The legislative power of this state shall 
be vested in the senate and assembly.”).  
177 PATRICIA SALKIN, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:01 (4th 
ed. 2012).  
178 Id. (noting that a state legislature’s power to regulate land use is 
derived from the state’s general police power).  
179 Id.  
180 See id. § 2:01 n.3 (“A zoning resolution in many of its features is 
distinctively a city affair, a concern of the locality, affecting as it does the 
density of population, the growth of city life, and the court of city values.” 
(quoting Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 711 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, C.J., 
concurring))); see also LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 174, at 
147–56. 
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In New York, local governments181 do not have any inherent 
law making authority; instead, such authority comes from state 
legislation and Article IX of the New York State Constitution.182 
Article IX, often referred to as the “Home Rule” article,183 
delegates both broad and limited powers to local government.184 
This includes the power to create laws that relate to the 
municipality’s “property, affairs or government.”185 However, 
the ability of local governments to exercise zoning authority is 
not explicit in the New York Constitution.186 Instead courts have 
held that such zoning power comes from enabling statutes such 
as the Statute of Local Governments and the Municipal Home 
Rule Law.187 The Statute of Local Governments includes the 
power for cities, villages, and towns to “adopt, amend and 
repeal zoning regulations”188 but allows for restriction by the 
state legislature.189 Counties are excluded and do not have the 
power to enact zoning regulations.190 The Municipal Home Rule 
Law, enacted by the Legislature, allows local governments to 
“have the power to adopt and amend local laws where and to the 
extent that its legislative body has the power to act by 
ordinance, resolution, rule or regulation.”191 This allows for 
local governments to enact ordinances or zoning laws within the 
                                                          
181 Local government is defined as “a county, city, town or village.” 
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3(d)(2). 
182 N.Y. CONST. art. IX (defining the powers and rights of local 
governments). 
183 LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 174, at 30. 
184 See id. at 30–34.  
185 N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2(c). 
186 See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 2:03.  
187 See id. §§ 2:03–04 (stating that although delegated to local 
government these powers are “quasi-constitutional” and can only be changed 
through legislation action at regular session in two calendar years). 
188 N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV’TS § 10(6) (McKinney 1994). 
189 Id. § 10 (“Grant[s of power] . . . to local governments . . . shall at 
all times be subject to such purposes, standards and procedures as the 
legislature may have heretofore prescribed or may hereafter prescribe.”). 
190 See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 2:09.  
191 Id. § 2:05 (citing N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 
1994)). 
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purview of their legislative power.192 Though cities, towns, and 
villages all have similar zoning authority,193 this Note will focus 
on the zoning power of towns.  
B. Zoning and Preemption  
Local governments can use their police power to create laws 
for the “protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being 
of persons or property.”194 Such police power also includes 
advancing the general welfare.195 Under both the Statute of Local 
Governments and the Municipal Home Rule Law, local 
governments can zone under their police power.196 Local 
government’s police power covers a broad array of activities 
from aesthetic concerns to preserving the character of the 
community.197 While the zoning power of local governments is 
quite broad, courts have limited their authority in some areas.198 
For instance, the Court of Appeals in New York has generally 
held that local governments cannot use their zoning power to 
create regulations that have the effect of excluding minorities or 
the poor.199 Another common area of contention is whether 
                                                          
192 Zoning ordinances and zoning laws are interchangeable and this Note 
will refer to both as zoning laws. There are some procedural differences 
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for a discussion of preemption. See SALKIN, supra note 177, §§ 3:01–03, 
3:13–40; see also Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 
N.Y.S.2d 458, 467–68 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (citing Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v. 
Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234–35 (N.Y. 1996) (referring to 
zoning ordinances as land use laws)).  
193 See SALKIN, supra note 177, §§ 2:06–08 (stating that villages and 
towns have similar zoning authority since all of their authority comes through 
the Municipal Home Rule Law).  
194 N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2(c)(10); see also MUN. HOME RULE § 10. 
195 SALKIN, supra note 177, § 6:01. 
196 See N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV’TS § 10(6) (McKinney 1994); MUN. 
HOME RULE § 10. 
197 See SALKIN, supra note 177, §§ 6:01–25. 
198 See id. §§ 6:02–03. 
199 See id. § 20:11 (citing Asian Am. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 
265 (N.Y. 1988)) (“The enabling acts of cities, towns and villages in New 
York do not authorize zoning to exclude from the enacting municipality 
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zoning rules can be used to ban or regulate specific uses of the 
land.200 These disputes often involve an analysis of the extent of 
a town’s police power and what constitutes the general welfare 
of a town.201  
The legislature retains the ability to impose restrictions on 
local zoning power.202 One such restriction is that zoning 
regulations must be part of a comprehensive plan.203 Another is 
that they cannot be part of “spot zoning,” singling out a small 
piece of land for a different use for the exclusive “benefit of the 
owner of such property and to the detriment of other owners.”204 
This is to ensure that zoning is used to build a better community 
and is a “means rather than [an] end.”205  
State law may preempt local zoning power either expressly 
or impliedly.206 With “express preemption,” the state explicitly 
prevents local municipalities from addressing an issue.207 Express 
preemption is found in the statutory text itself and clearly 
illustrates that the state and not a local town is responsible for 
handling a specific issue.208 When there is “implied preemption,” 
the legislature has evidenced an intent to supersede a local 
municipality in a particular area.209 Implied preemption generally 
                                                          
persons of low or moderate income, and if the party attacking the ordinance 
establishes that it has either of an exclusory purpose or effect, the ordinance 
will be annulled.”). 
200 See id. §§ 11:01–38. 
201 See id. § 6:01. 
202 See id. § 4:02; see also Goho, supra note 14, at 5. 
203 See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 4:03. 
204 Id. § 4:10 (quoting Rodgers v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 
734 (N.Y. 1951)). 
205 See id. § 4:03 (citing Asian Am. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265 
(N.Y. 1988)).  
206 See id. § 4:22; see also Weiland, supra note 16, at 470; Kenneally & 
Mathes, supra note 14.  
207 See, e.g., N.Y. COMM’N ON LOCAL GOV’T EFFICIENCY & 
COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 15; Goho, supra note 14, at 5; Weiland, supra 
note 16, at 470. 
208 See Weiland, supra note 16, at 470; Goho, supra note 14, at 5; see 
also N.Y. COMM’N ON LOCAL GOV’T EFFICIENCY & COMPETITIVENESS, 
supra note 15. 
209 Weiland, supra note 16, at 470–71.  
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appears in two forms. One form is “conflict preemption,” where 
the local law is “found to conflict with or frustrate the purpose” 
of the state law.210 The other is “field preemption,” which occurs 
if state law concerning a particular issue is so broad that it 
“occupies the field,” leaving no ability for local discretion211 or 
creates a “comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in a 
particular area.”212  
Conflicts often arise in determining whether there is implied 
preemption. Unlike express preemption, which is often easily 
resolved based on the plain meaning of the statute,213 implied 
preemption is more difficult to discern.214 The courts often 
examine “the nature of the subject matter regulated, the purpose 
and scope of the state legislative scheme, and the need for 
statewide uniformity.”215 Additionally, a local law is not 
preempted simply because it prohibits an activity that is allowed 
under state law.216 If this were the case, the power of local 
governments would be “illusory.”217 Furthermore, implied 
preemption does not require an express statement by the 
legislature.218 Instead the court tries to discern legislative 
                                                          
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487, 
490 (N.Y. 1983). 
213 See, e.g., Inc. Vill. of Lloyd Harbor v. Town of Huntington, 149 
N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1958) (holding that a local village cannot zone out a 
park that a state law specifically authorizes). 
214 See Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 14, at 3.  
215 Id.  
216 See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 
915, 919–20 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that the city was not preempted, either 
expressly or implicitly, by the New York State Human Rights Law when it 
prohibited discrimination in clubs even though the city was banning an 
activity allowed under state law). 
217 Id. at 920. 
218 See Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 489 (holding that Red Hook’s 
Local Law 2, which required a license for power plants that the town could 
deny due to zoning rules, was invalid because it was preempted by Article 
VIII). The Legislature made it clear that the purpose of Article VIII was to 
expedite the process and create a “unified procedure.” Id. Additionally, 
article VIII had a detailed regulatory scheme, which the court said was 
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intent.219 Courts judge legislative intent by investigating the 
state’s public policy, the language of the statute, and whether 
state law has created a “comprehensive and detailed regulatory 
scheme.”220 Issues commonly arise as to what type of statement 
by the legislature or what level of detail in a regulatory scheme 
is needed to show intent.221 Resolving those issues often requires 
a fact intensive search into the statute itself or the legislative 
purpose and history.222 
C. Mining in New York—The Precursor to the Hydrofracking 
Debate 
The Court of Appeals has never addressed the issue of 
whether a town can use its zoning power to ban hydrofracking. 
However, the Court of Appeals has addressed the extent to 
which towns can use their zoning power to control and ban 
mining.223 The issue in mining, similar to that of hydrofracking, 
is whether local zoning power is preempted by a state statute 
regulating that industry. In mining, the focus was on the Mined 
Land Reclamation Act (“MLRA”),224 which bears many 
similarities to the OGSML.225 The Court of Appeals addressed 
this issue in Frew Run Gravel Products, Inc. v. Town of 
Carroll226 and Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Town of 
                                                          
evidence of the legislature’s intent to preempt. Id. 
219 See, e.g., id.  
220 See id.; see also Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 
903, 904–05 (N.Y. 1987) (upholding local law because there was no 
indication that state law preempted the local regulatory scheme). 
221 See Jancyn Mfg. Corp., 518 N.E.2d at 907; see also N.Y. State Club 
Ass’n, 505 N.E.2d at 917. 
222 See Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 490 (looking at the statute to 
discern intent); see also Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 906 (looking at the purpose 
of the statute, here to protect the environment). 
223 See, e.g., Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 
N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987); see also Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of 
Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1996). 
224 Mined Land Reclamation Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 27-0030 
(McKinney 2007). 
225 See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 11:23.50. 
226 Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921. 
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Sardinia.227 These cases dealt specifically with whether a town 
could use its zoning power to limit where mining could occur 
and if a town could ban mining entirely.228  
In Frew Run, the Court of Appeals held that a town was 
permitted to use its zoning power to regulate the location of a 
mine. In that case, the town of Carroll passed a zoning 
ordinance that regulated the placement of mines within the town, 
although the ordinance did not ban them entirely.229 A mining 
company sued the town claiming that the town’s zoning powers 
were preempted by a state statute, the MLRL.230 The court 
reviewed the text of the statute and found that the town’s zoning 
regulations were not superseded by the MLRL because the 
zoning regulations did not “relat[e] to the extractive mining 
industry.”231 Local laws would be superseded only if they 
detailed the specific operations and practice of how the mining 
could occur.232 Towns had the power to regulate the land itself 
and thereby could control the locations of the mines.233 
Additionally, the court held that there was no evidence of 
intention by the legislature to preempt local zoning power.234 The 
legislature’s intent, concern for the environment, was consistent 
with the aim of the zoning ordinances.235 
In Gernatt, the Court of Appeals affirmed a town’s use of its 
zoning power to ban mining entirely. In this case, the town of 
Sardina passed a zoning law which banned the construction of 
any new mines in town.236 The law did not affect previously 
constructed mines.237 The town claimed this was an extension of 
                                                          
227 Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at 1234. 
228 See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921; see also Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at 
1230. 
229 See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921. 
230 Id. at 921–22.  
231 Id. at 922.  
232 Id. at 923. 
233 Id. at 923–24. 
234 Id. at 923. 
235 Id.  
236 See Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 
1226, 1230–31 (N.Y. 1996).  
237 Id. at 1231 
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the zoning power that the Court of Appeals approved in Frew 
Run, where the mines were allowed but only in certain areas.238 
In Gernatt, the court held that the town’s use of its zoning 
power to ban all mining within the town did not violate the 
MLRL.239 The court noted that without a “clear expression of 
legislative intent to preempt local control over land use” the 
local zoning laws were not preempted.240 The court also found 
that towns are not “obligated to permit the exploitation of any 
and all natural resources within th[at] town.”241 
These two cases established an important baseline for how 
towns may use their zoning power. However, both cases dealt 
only with mining and the zoning power of towns in relation to 
the MLRL.242 Therefore, a number of oil and gas companies 
claim the decisions in Frew Run and Gernatt are not applicable 
to hydrofracking.243  
D. The Legal Journey of Hydrofracking in New York 
Supporters and opponents of hydrofracking hold divergent 
opinions as to whether zoning bans on hydrofracking are 
preempted by state law. Gas companies argue that 
hydrofracking, as a type of gas drilling, can only be controlled 
by state law, specifically the OGSML.244 They further argue that 
                                                          
238 See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 923–24.  
239 See Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at 1235–37. 
240 Id. at 1234. 
241 Id. at 1235 (“A municipality is not obligated to permit the exploitation 
of any and all natural resources within the town as a permitted use if limiting 
that use is a reasonable exercise of its police powers to prevent damage to the 
rights of others and to promote the interest of the community as a whole.”). 
242 See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921; see also Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at 
1230. 
243 See Charles Gottleib, Regulating Natural Gas Development Through 
Local Planning and Land Use Controls, N.Y. ZONING L. & PRAC. REP., 
May/June 2012, at 1, 3; Campbell, supra note 132 (“West, the Norse 
attorney, warned the appellate justices against falling into the ‘trap’ of 
judging based on past decisions on sand and gravel, which are regulated 
under a separate portion of state law.”) 
244 Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-
0303(2) (McKinney 2007) (“The provisions of this article shall supersede all 
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the OGSML preempts local zoning laws through both express 
language in the statute and implicitly through state occupation of 
gas mining regulation and legislative intent.245 Opponents of 
hydrofracking disagree and claim that the zoning bans are a 
proper exercise of the zoning power of towns.246 Furthermore, 
antifracking advocates argue that they are following precedent 
set by the New York Court of Appeals247 regarding the ability of 
towns to use their zoning power to ban mining activity within 
their town.248 Hydrofracking opponents focus on previous Court 
of Appeals rulings, where the court did not find express or 
implied preemption in the MLRL, and cite the similar language 
between the OGSML and the MLRL.249  
Gas companies have challenged the hydrofracking bans in 
two cases—Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden250 and 
Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield.251 In both 
cases the hydrofracking bans were upheld by the trial courts and 
                                                          
local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution 
mining industries; but shall not supersede local government jurisdiction over 
local roads or the rights of local governments under the real property tax 
law.”). 
245 See Gottleib, supra note 243, at 3.  
246 Id. at 2; see also Slottje & Slottje, supra note 119. 
247 The Court of Appeals upheld selective zoning regarding mining in 
Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 
1987), and a town’s use of zoning power to exclude mines in Gernatt Asphalt 
Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1996). 
248 See Gottleib, supra note 243, at 2.  
249 Id.; see also Mined Land Reclamation Law, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. 
§ 23-2703(2) (McKinney 2007) (“[F]or the purposes stated herein, this title 
shall superseded all other state and local laws relating to the extractive 
mining industry.”) (emphasis added); ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0303(2) (“The 
provisions of this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating 
to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining industries; but shall not 
supersede local government jurisdiction over local roads or the rights of local 
governments under the real property tax law.”) (emphasis added).  
250 Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458 
(Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of 
Dryden, No. 515227 (App. Div. May 2, 2013). 
251 Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 
722 (Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d, No. 515498 (App. Div. May 2, 2013). 
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by the Appellate Division.252 However, the issue is far from 
settled, as hydrofracking ban opponents are currently seeking 
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.253 These cases concern 
the extent of a town’s zoning power and whether hydrofracking 
bans are a proper use of that power.  
In Anschutz Exploration, the trial court found that the New 
York legislature did not intend to preempt local control over 
land use and zoning when it passed the OGSML.254 Due to the 
similar language between the OGSML and the MLRL, the trial 
court based its decision largely on the precedent set by the Court 
of Appeals in Frew Run.255 The court found that the OGSML’s 
language, superseding those laws regulating oil and gas drilling, 
indicated only laws that dealt with the actual operation of 
drilling. The OGSML did not prevent local governments from 
determining where within their borders the drilling should take 
place.256 It was within the town’s land use power to ban the 
location of hydrofracking drilling sites if the town thought that it 
would negatively affect the community.257 Such a ban did not 
rise to the level of regulation.258 In effect, only the state can 
regulate the “how” of mining but local municipalities can 
regulate the “where.”259  
Additionally, the court in Anschutz found that there was no 
“clear expression of legislative intent” in the OGSML to 
preempt zoning laws, language that had been included in other 
state statutes.260 While another trial court had interpreted the 
                                                          
252 Campbell, supra note 133. 
253 Id.  
254 Anschutz Exploration, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 471.  
255 Id. at 471–73.  
256 Id.  
257 Id. 
258 See id. at 470–73. 
259 SALKIN, supra note 177, § 11:23.50. 
260 Anschutz Exploration, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 470. New York has clearly 
expressed its intent to preempt local zoning ordinances in other state statutes. 
See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1107 (McKinney 2007) (“[N]o 
municipality may, except as expressly authorized by this article or the board, 
require any approval, consent, permit, certificate or other condition including 
conformity with local zoning or land use laws and ordinances” (emphasis 
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OGSML to preempt local fees being charged, that court had not 
examined the bill’s language with regard to zoning.261 
Furthermore, the bill’s language and legislative history show no 
indication that the legislature believed that maximizing the 
drilling for natural gas at the cost of local sovereignty was in the 
best interests of New York State.262 Additionally, the OGSML 
only touched on technical concerns,263 and it did not address 
common zoning problems such as traffic, noise, and protecting 
the character of a community.264 Lastly, the court found that, as 
in Gernatt, the town did not engage in exclusionary zoning, as 
there is no obligation to permit the exploitation of a town’s 
natural resources.265 Anschutz was a clear victory for 
hydrofracking opponents, finding that towns could use their 
zoning power to ban hydrofracking.266 Shortly after Anchutz, 
other trial courts would weigh in on the legality of 
hydrofracking bans.267  
In Cooperstown Holstein, a different trial court upheld the 
local municipality’s power to use their zoning power to ban 
hydrofracking.268 The court found that the purpose and intent of 
                                                          
added)); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(e) (McKinney 2011) (“A 
community residence established pursuant to this section and family care 
homes shall be deemed a family unit, for the purposes of locals laws and 
ordinances.” (emphasis added)). 
261 Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone, 447 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 
1982), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div.).  
262 See Anschutz Exploration, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 469–70. 
263 The technical concerns in the OGSML include “where operations may 
be conducted, such as those governing delineation of pools, well spacing, and 
integration of unit” and the distance between wells to “comport with 
geological features of the underlying pool[s].” Id. at 470. 
264 Id.  
265 Id.; see also Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc., v. Town of Sardinia, 664 
N.E.2d 1226, 1236 (N.Y. 1996).  
266 See Anschutz Exploration, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 471–72. 
267 See Lena Groeger, Decision on Dryden Fracking Ban Could Set a 
National Precedent, SYRACUSE.COM (Feb. 23, 2012, 12:50 PM), 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2012/02/decision_on_drydens_fracki
ng_b.html. 
268 Jinjoo Lee, Another Court Upholds Fracking Ban, CORNELL DAILY 
SUN (Feb. 27, 2012), http://cornellsun.com/node/50051. 
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the OGSML was to regulate the industry and not to preempt 
local land use authority.269 The court relied heavily on Frew Run 
and Gernatt but utilized a more in-depth historical analysis than 
in Anschutz, to ascertain legislative intent.270 The court, looking 
at previous state statutes and legislative memoranda,271 found that 
the legislative intent was to minimize waste.272 Additionally, 
amendments in 1978 replaced the phrase “foster, encourage and 
promote” regarding the state role in gas production with the 
word “regulate.”273 The court found that this did not show clear 
legislative intent for state law to supersede local zoning 
control.274  
Anschutz and Cooperstown Holstein were recently upheld by 
the Appellate Division, but attorneys for the hydrofracking 
industry have indicated that they intend to appeal.275 While the 
Court of Appeals only grants leave to a fraction of the cases that 
request it,276 there is a strong chance that the court will grant 
such leave here since it is a matter of first impression that has 
repercussions across the state. If the decisions are upheld by the 
Court of Appeals, towns will be able to ban hydrofracking 
through their zoning powers limiting where hydrofracking will 
occur in New York State. Moreover, these cases also provide 
the Court of Appeals an opportunity to clarify their own opaque 
jurisprudence on implied preemption and its appropriate 
application with regard to zoning. 
                                                          
269 Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 
722, 730 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
270 See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 11:23.50. 
271 Cooperstown Holstein, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 723–29 (examining Article 
3-A of the Conservation Law, amendments in 1978, amendments in 1981, 
and the Legislative Memorandum). 
272 Id. at 728–29.  
273 Id. at 726.  
274 See id. at 729. 
275 Campbell, supra note 133. 
276 Id. 
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III. IMPLIED PREEMPTION AND HYDROFRACKING 
A. Zoning and Implied Preemption  
A number of New York Court of Appeals cases have 
addressed when zoning laws are implicitly preempted by state 
laws.277 The issue of preemption most commonly arises in regard 
to exclusionary zoning278 or prevention of specific uses of land.279 
Both are a form of “NIMBYism.” NIMBY, which stands for 
“not in my backyard,” refers to objections by the community 
about the placement of certain activities or structures in their 
particular neighborhood.280 Such NIMBY problems often arise 
from projects that generate extensive benefits but impose a 
facility or project that negatively affects the local residents.281 
Examples include when communities use their zoning power to 
restrict housing for the low income or mentally disabled282 and 
the placement of waste disposal facilities.283 Issues arise when 
                                                          
277 See, e.g., Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928 
(N.Y. 1991); Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346 (N.Y. 1989); 
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487 (N.Y. 
1983). 
278 Exclusionary zoning is often employed to describe land use laws 
which exclude certain people or projects from a certain community. The 
focus is often on individuals rather then uses. For more information see 
SALKIN, supra note 177, §§ 20:01–02. 
279 Often the problem arises when the specific uses of land have a 
relation to the public welfare. For more information see id. §§ 11:01–06. 
280 Nimby Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/american_english/Nimby (last visited Dec. 15, 2012) (“[A] person 
who objects to the siting of something perceived as unpleasant or potentially 
dangerous in their own neighborhood, such as a landfill or hazardous waste 
facility, especially while raising no such objections to similar developments 
elsewhere.”). 
281 See Barak D. Richman, Mandating Negotiations to Solve the NIMBY 
Problem, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 223, 223 (2001–02) (“NIMBY 
conflicts arise from projects that typically generate widespread dispersed 
benefits while imposing concentrated costs, such as homeless shelters, 
prisons, airports, sports stadiums, and waste disposal sites.”). 
282 SALKIN, supra note 177, §§ 20:01–02. 
283 Richman, supra note 281, at 223.  
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the placement of the project, while perhaps undesirable for the 
neighborhood, is essential for the community as a whole.284  
One means to address NIMBYism is through legislation 
controlling placement. Since local municipalities derive their 
authority from the state legislature,285 municipalities cannot pass 
zoning plans that are preempted by state law.286 The local law is 
expressly preempted if the state law reserves control over the 
zoning procedure for a specific industry for itself.287 However, 
even if the state law does not specifically reserve control over 
zoning, the local law could still be impliedly preempted.288 In 
both forms of implied preemption (conflict and field), the key is 
to analyze the intent of the legislature.289 The language in some 
Court of Appeals decisions seems to indicate a broad reading for 
what constitutes implied preemption with regard to zoning but 
actual decisions have created an almost impossibly narrow 
application. 
B. (Trying) To Find Implied Preemption  
The Court of Appeals has found that the intent to preempt 
does not have to be expressly stated and it is “enough that the 
Legislature has impliedly evinced its desire to do so.”290 It is 
also not enough “that the state and local laws touch upon the 
same area.”291 Instead, the court can look to declared state policy 
to infer whether the legislature intended to preempt local laws.292 
                                                          
284 Id. at 223–24. 
285 E.g., N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
286 See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 4:22.  
287 See Weiland, supra note 16, at 472; Goho, supra note 14, at 5.  
288 N.Y. COMM’N ON LOCAL GOV’T EFFICIENCY & COMPETITIVENESS, 
supra note 15.  
289 See id.  
290 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487, 
487 (N.Y. 1983) (citations omitted). 
291 Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 930 (N.Y. 
1991) (quoting Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907 
(N.Y. 1987)). 
292 Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 490 (citing Robin v. Inc. Vill. of 
Hempstead, 285 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1972)). 
 LOCAL HYDROFRACKING BANS 667 
However, in actuality, the Court of Appeals has applied a very 
narrow test and has been loath to find implied preemption by the 
state with regard to zoning without an express statement of 
intent.293 The apparent necessity of such a clear and unequivocal 
statement of intent by the state raises the question of whether in 
the absence of such a statement any zoning act could be 
considered impliedly preempted. 
For example, in Incorporated Village of Nyack v. Daytop 
Village Inc,294 the Court of Appeals held that “separate levels of 
regulatory oversight can coexist”295 without preemption and that 
the detailed regulatory structure alone did not “evidence[] a 
desire” to preempt local zoning power.296 The court held that the 
Mental Hygiene Law,297 a very detailed regulatory scheme, did 
not preempt local zoning law since there was no clear indication 
of legislative intent to preempt.298 Although not specifically 
stated, the court’s failure to find implied preemption in this case 
establishes an incredibly high burden for what constitutes 
implied preemption. DJL Restaurant Corp. v. City of New York 
                                                          
293 See Daytop Vill., 583 N.E.2d at 928–32; see also Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d 
at 906; Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 
(N.Y. 1987). 
294 Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d at 929 (holding that local zoning 
regulations for substance abuse treatments were not preempted by state law, 
even though article 19 of the Mental Hygiene Law created a detailed 
regulatory structure because there is no evidence of legislative intent to 
preempt local zoning laws). 
295 Id. at 931. 
296 Id. (quoting People v. Cook, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457 (N.Y. 1974)). 
297 “DSAS [Division of Substance Abuse Services] is charged with the 
responsibility for establishing procedures and setting standards for the 
approval of substance abuse programs.” Daytop Vill., 583 N.E.2d at 930 
(citing N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 23.01 (McKinney 1991) (repealed 1999)). 
DSAS also is to “cooperate with and assist local agencies and community 
service boards in the development and periodic review of local 
comprehensive plans and programs for substance abuse services and approve 
such plans and programs . . . .” Id. (citing MENTAL HYG. § 19.07(b)(4) 
(McKinney 2011)). DSAS also must “inspect and approve or disapprove the 
facilities of and the services provided by substance abuse programs . . . .” 
Id. (citing MENTAL HYG. § 19.07(b)(5)). 
298 Id. at 931.  
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also demonstrates this high burden.299 In that case, the Court of 
Appeals held that even though adult establishments were 
regulated by state law, local zoning rules were not impliedly 
preempted because state law did not address the “secondary 
effects” of these establishments.300 Zoning laws are purposefully 
designed for local communities to address such concerns and 
protect their quality of life.301 Additionally, the court held that 
there was no statement of legislative intent in the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Law indicating that the state intended to 
preempt local zoning laws.302  
Frew Run and Gernatt are additional examples of the 
reluctance of New York courts to find preemption without a 
specific statement of legislative intent.303 In both cases, the court 
read the MLRL as not limiting zoning in large part because 
there was no explicit language of legislative intent and the local 
town ordinances were “consistent with the statute’s overall aim 
of protecting the environment.”304  
The Court of Appeals has also applied this narrow view of 
implied preemption to questions of local power outside of 
zoning. In the case of Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk,305 
the Court of Appeals refused to find that a state law that 
prohibited the sale and use of certain sewage system cleaning 
additives was implicitly preempted by local laws, which set 
                                                          
299 DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 188, 191–92 
(N.Y. 2001) (holding that local zoning rules regulating adult industry 
locations were not preempted even though the venues served alcohol, which 
is regulated by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law). 
300 Id. at 191–92 (defining “secondary effects” as “increased crime rates, 
reduced property values, neighborhood deterioration and inappropriate 
exposure of children to sexually oriented environments”). 
301 See id. at 188–89. 
302 See id. at 191. 
303 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
304 Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 
923 (N.Y. 1987); see also Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 
664 N.E.2d 1226, 1235–36 (N.Y. 1996). 
305 Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 1987) 
(finding no preemption where plaintiff’s sewage additives, were approved for 
sale by state law but were not allowed to be sold according to a more 
stringent local standard). 
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stricter standards for the sale of sewage cleaning additives.306 
The court looked to the legislature’s intent and to the statutory 
scheme.307 Although the statutory regulatory scheme was very 
detailed,308 the court held that it was not thorough or extensive 
enough to have superseded all possible future local regulation.309 
A key reason that the court did not find implied preemption 
involved the absence of an express statement from the state of 
its intent to preempt.310 The court also held that implied 
preemption could not be found merely because both pieces of 
legislation had the same goal.311 In other cases, the Court of 
Appeals has also held that local laws that expand a definition in 
state law are not preempted as long as the legislature has not 
“evidenced a desire” to preempt.312  
When the Court of Appeals has held local zoning laws are 
impliedly preempted, there is often specific language in the bill 
itself indicating a desire for preemption.313 For example, in 
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Town of Red Hook,314 
                                                          
306 See id. at 906.  
307 Id. at 905–07. 
308 The State law prohibited the sale and use of certain sewage system 
cleaning additives in Long Island. It also empowered the State Commissioner 
of Environmental Conservation to create regulations forcing manufacturers to 
disclose their chemical components and restrict sale of products with 
restricted chemical material after investigation and hearing. See id. at 903–
04. 
309 Id. at 907. 
310 Id. (“Although an express statement of preemption is not required it is 
significant that no such statement appears in the statute . . . .”). 
311 Id. (finding that both the local law and state law shared the same goal, 
protection of the Long Island water supply). 
312 N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 920 
(N.Y. 1987) (holding that New York City’s narrower definition of what 
constituted a private club was not preempted by state antidiscrimination 
laws). 
313 However courts have been more likely to find implied preemption of 
local laws not connected to zoning. See Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Town 
of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that a local law setting 
up a Transportation Impact Fee was impliedly preempted by the state 
regulatory structure regulating highway funds).  
314 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487 
(N.Y. 1983). 
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the court held that Red Hook’s Local Law 2, which allowed the 
town to refuse Consolidated Edison Company a permit under its 
zoning law, was preempted by Article VIII of the Public Service 
Law.315 The court cited the legislature’s purpose, clearly 
expressed in Article VIII, and the detailed regulatory structure.316 
Article VIII plainly indicated that the legislature intended “to 
provide for the expeditious resolution of all matters concerning 
the location of major steam electric generating facilities.”317 This 
was reaffirmed when the Legislature reenacted Article VIII in 
1978, asserting “its purpose was to have the Siting Board 
balance all interests, including local interests, on a State-wide 
basis.”318 Although there is language indicating the role of the 
regulatory structure in the decision, it is clear that the holding 
was based primarily on the very express legislative intent 
indicated in Article VIII.  
Together, these cases illustrate that when the Court of 
Appeals examines whether state law impliedly preempts local 
law, especially with respect to zoning, it rarely finds such 
preemption without an explicit statement from the state 
legislature. Although previous Court of Appeals decisions 
include language that an explicit expression of legislative intent 
is not required,319 the reality appears to be otherwise. If the 
previously mentioned cases are any indication, it does not appear 
that any comprehensive regulatory scheme, absent a declared 
intention to preempt local power, will be sufficient for the Court 
of Appeals to find implied preemption.320  
                                                          
315 See id. at 489–90. 
316 Id. at 490–91. 
317 Id. at 490 (quoting L. 1972, ch. 385, § 1).  
318 Id. (quoting L. 1978, ch. 708, § 1). 
319 See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 
906 (N.Y. 1987).  
320 See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 490 (holding that 
Article XIII contained an express statement about the legislature’s intent to 
preempt local zoning rules).  
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C. Hydrofracking Bans Are Not Implicitly Preempted  
If the Court of Appeals follows the exacting standard it has 
thus far used for determining implied preemption, it is likely to 
uphold the town’s hydrofracking bans.321 There are two aspects 
of implied preemption that need to be analyzed: conflict 
preemption and field preemption.322 Either is sufficient for a law 
to be preempted and both are controlled by the intent of the 
legislature.323 Since there is no explicit statement in the OGSML 
indicating unequivocal intent by the legislature to preempt local 
land use control over gas drilling, the Court of Appeals will 
likely find that local hydrofracking bans are not preempted. 
There is no conflict preemption between the OGSML and 
local hydrofracking bans because the bans do not frustrate the 
purpose of the OGSML. There is no inherent conflict simply 
because the local zoning laws prohibit what state law allows, 
otherwise local power would be meaningless.324 Instead, the 
court looks to legislative intent in the statute itself.325 The 
OGSML indicates that its main purpose is not to ensure that 
drilling occurs anywhere that it is possible but to prevent waste 
and protect the rights of the general public.326 While the OGSML 
                                                          
321 This Note does not examine whether or not the Court of Appeals will 
find express preemption in the OGSML. 
322 See Goho, supra note 14, at 5; N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON LOCAL 
GOV’T EFFICACY & COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 15.  
323 See Goho, supra note 14; see also N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON LOCAL 
GOV’T EFFICACY & COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 15. 
324 See Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907 
(N.Y. 1987); see also N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505 
N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y. 1987). 
325 See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d 487; N.Y. State Club 
Ass’n, 505 N.E.2d at 915; see Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 906 (“No preemptive 
intent is evident from either the Legislature’s declaration of State policy . . . 
or the statutory scheme which has been enacted.”). 
326 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0301 (McKinney 2007) (“It is hereby 
declared to be in the public interest to regulate the development, production 
and utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in this state in such a 
manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and to provide for the operation 
and development of oil and gas properties in such a manner that a greater 
ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be had and that correlative right of all 
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does mention the “greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas,” that 
is in reference to the operation and development of the sites, not 
where such sites should occur.327 The only language which 
explicitly restricts local power refers to the “regulation” of 
mining.328 Such a term though has never been interpreted to 
restrict all interaction with that activity.329 The OGSML makes 
no mention of noise, traffic, and neighborhood character, all of 
which are responsibilities normally left to local government.330 
As the Court of Appeals held in DJL Restaurant, these are the 
types of concerns that are specifically meant to be addressed by 
zoning.331 Local zoning laws that address these issues are not 
“regulating” hydrofracking but only affecting where 
hydrofracking can take place.332 In addition, two levels of 
regulatory oversight, one stricter than the other, have been 
allowed333 even when local law prohibits an activity allowed 
under state law.334  
Additionally, there is no field preemption because under the 
Court of Appeals’ narrow view of implied preemption, the 
regulatory structure of the OGSML is not sufficiently detailed or 
comprehensive enough to eliminate local discretion.335 Even in 
                                                          
owners and the rights of all persons including landowners and the general 
public may be fully protected.”). 
327 Id.  
328 Id. § 23-0303(2). 
329 See Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 
1226, 1235 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 
518 N.E.2d 920, 923 (N.Y. 1987). 
330 SALKIN, supra note 177, § 11:23.50. 
331 DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 188, 191–92 
(N.Y. 2001). 
332 See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 923–24; Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at 1235–
36. 
333 See Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907 
(N.Y. 1987). 
334 See, e.g., id. (holding that a local regulation is not preempted by a 
state law that also addresses the same issue); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City 
of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that local law can have 
a narrower definition of what constitutes a private club than state 
antidiscrimination laws). 
335 See Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928 (N.Y. 
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cases where the state legislature had a more comprehensive 
regulatory scheme, such as for substance abuse housing,336 
discrimination,337 and mining,338 local zoning laws were not 
considered preempted. The OGSML regulatory structure is not 
as detailed as that of the cases above, focusing only on reserving 
power for the state to control the regulation of the gas mining 
rather than its placement.339 There is nothing to indicate that the 
purpose of the OGSML is to ensure hydrofracking happens 
anywhere that it can.340 It is telling that the Court of Appeals 
held in Garnett that there is no explicit requirement that towns 
permit mining just because they have such resources.341 
Additionally, the current regulatory structure does not create a 
system where a single town’s decision to ban hydrofracking 
would affect another town’s ability to allow hydrofracking. 
While some commenters claim that natural gas production is 
only feasible over many municipalities,342 that claim is unlikely 
as towns are often separated by many miles and the 
hydrofracking bans would only affect drilling sites within that 
specific town. It is also unlikely that the hydrofracking bans 
would be adopted by all towns due to the victory of 
                                                          
1991) (holding that local zoning regulations for substance abuse treatments 
were not preempted by a detailed state regulatory structure because there was 
no evidence of legislative intent to preempt local zoning laws); see also 
Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 907 (upholding a local law banning cleaning additives 
even though cleaning additives were also regulated through state scheme). 
336 See Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d at 928–29. 
337 See N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 505 N.E.2d at 916. 
338 See Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc., v. Town of Sardina, 664 N.E.2d 
1226, 1227 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 
518 N.E.2d 920, 921 (N.Y. 1987). 
339 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2007) (“The 
provisions of this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating 
to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining industries; but shall not 
supersede local government jurisdiction over local roads or the rights of local 
governments under the real property tax law.”). 
340 See Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 
458, 464–66 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
341 Gernatt, 664 N.E.2d at 1235. 
342 Gregory R. Nearpass & Robert J. Brenner, High Volume Hydraulic 
Fracturing and Home Rule: The Struggle for Control, 76 ALB. L. REV. 167, 
188–89 (2013). 
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hydrofracking proponents in recent elections343 and the presence 
of prohydrofracking resolutions in over fifty towns.344 Even if all 
towns did enact hydrofracking bans, that would not alter the 
preemption argument since the language in the OGSML speaks 
to regulation of drilling where it occurs,345 not the maximization 
of gas drilling everywhere. The limited regulatory structure 
created by the OGSML is not comprehensive enough to imply 
that the legislature intended to occupy the field and preempt all 
local zoning laws. 
The Court of Appeals is not likely to find that towns’ 
hydrofracking bans are impliedly preempted due to their own 
narrow interpretation of what constitutes implied preemption. 
Court of Appeals jurisprudence appears to indicate that only an 
explicit statement of legislative intent will preempt even the most 
exacting of state regulations. While the OGSML does 
specifically discuss control over the regulation of gas drilling, 
there is no explicit statement indicating that the state intended to 
reserve power over the placement of gas drilling locations.346 
Without such an explicit statement, the Court of Appeals is 
unlikely to find local zoning concerns impliedly preempted.  
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals’ narrow interpretation of implied 
preemption is appropriate public policy for New York in general 
and specifically with regard to hydrofracking. Although 
hydrofracking has been conducted for many years in other 
states, there are still a number of questions as to its effect on the 
local environment, including tainted water and methane 
explosions.347 These environmental concerns are important as 
they could affect the drinking water of local towns and New 
                                                          
343 Esch, supra note 116.  
344 See Map of Positive Resolutions for Hydrofracking, supra note 120 
(showing specifically that the towns in favor of hydrofracking are also along 
the Marcellus Shale, the most lucrative area for hydrofracking).  
345 ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0303(2). 
346 See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 11:23.50. 
347 See WILBER, supra note 53, at 89–92; Caruso, supra note 71. 
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York City,348 as well as impact tourism and local agriculture.349 
Ensuring that local governments are able to ban hydrofracking 
within their communities will provide another level of protection 
against any possible dangers from hydrofracking. It will also 
allow those communities eager for jobs and economic benefits to 
permit hydrofracking. An open debate about the pros and cons 
of hydrofracking will increase residents’ knowledge and through 
the local political process, individuals will be able to have their 
voices heard.  
Furthermore, town hydrofracking bans do not present a 
NIMBY problem. Unlike a waste reactor, which is often 
necessary for the community and needs to be placed somewhere, 
hydrofracking does not need to occur. Hydrofracking is not 
necessary for a community and while it may bring economic 
benefits, those benefits also come with risks. Individual towns 
should have the ability to decide for themselves if the costs 
outweigh the benefits. Additionally, even if towns are able to 
enact hydrofracking bans, it is unlikely that would end 
hydrofracking in New York State. Over fifty towns have already 
enacted resolutions supporting hydrofracking.350 The ability of 
local governments to ban hydrofracking also appears to be in 
line with recent unofficial reports from the DEC indicating that 
hydrofracking would only occur in those areas that desire it.351  
Additionally, allowing local governments to ban 
hydrofracking will not negatively affect other energy producers 
in New York State. The recent Power NY Act of 2011352 
includes express preemption language that creates a “one stop 
approval process for new and expanded power plans” including 
wind farms.353 Since the Power New York Act expressly gives 
                                                          
348 See Kastenbaum, supra note 58. 
349 See Gralla, supra note 56.  
350 Map of Positive Resolutions for Hydrofracking, supra note 120. 
351 Karlin, supra note 95 (citing recent reports, which the Governor 
refuses to deny, indicating that his administration is considering a plan where 
hydrofracking would only be permitted in willing communities).  
352 Power NY Act of 2011, S. 5844, Assemb. 8510, Reg. Sess. (codified 
in scattered sections of N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW). 
353 New York Legislature Enacts Power Plant Siting Law, Bryan Cave 
Bulletin (Bryan Cave, LLP, St. Louis, MO), Aug. 9, 2011, at 1, available at 
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control over zoning to the state, there is no need to look for 
implied preemption. This is different from the OGSML, which 
only has specific language preempting regulation and does not 
have any explicit language regarding zoning or the placement of 
drilling sites. 
Permitting New York towns to ban hydrofracking does go 
further than other states but that is a positive development. 
While West Virginia courts have struck down hydrofracking 
bans, their reasoning focused on the “narrow” power held by 
municipalities and West Virginia DEP’s primary authority to 
protect the environment.354 For the New York Court of Appeals 
to analyze the OGSML in a similar manner would upend years 
of jurisprudence that allowed local municipalities greater control 
through zoning. It is also not clear in Pennsylvania what level of 
control local municipalities will have over hydrofracking.355 It is 
possible that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will take a similar 
position to that of the New York Court of Appeals and adopt a 
broad view of zoning power. Regardless, the environmental 
issues that Pennsylvania has encountered in its quick embrace of 
hydrofracking356 are additional evidence that the best path 
forward is greater local control.  
The New York Court of Appeals should also take this 
opportunity to clarify that implied preemption should only be 
found with regard to zoning if there is an explicit statement of 
intent from the legislature. Such a statement would simply 
codify what is already effectively unstated law. This would have 
a number of policy benefits for New York State. It would create 
a clear bright line rule that would give local municipalities a 
greater sense of what they are able to do and would decrease the 
number of lawsuits challenging their authority.  
                                                          
http://www.bryancave.com/files/Publication/b03ff613-d188-440a-bd0b-
01f498b4e1bc/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f8e28986-f958-4912-91e0-
119d5dccd6e0/New%20York%20Power%20Plant%20Siting%20Article%20X
%20Client%20Alert_v7%20(AP).pdf. 
354 Orford, supra note 162.  
355 Detrow, supra 157.  
356 See Caruso, supra note 71; see also Drakem & Efstahiou Jr., supra 
note 76. 
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Greater control for local municipalities is especially 
important with regard to zoning. A municipality’s zoning power 
is its most effective weapon to protect their community. As 
Judge Cardozo commented, “a zoning resolution in many of its 
features is distinctively a city affair, a concern of the locality, 
affecting as it does the density of population, the growth of city 
life, and the court of city values.”357 Due to the unique 
importance of zoning, it is proper for the Court of Appeals to 
adopt such a bright line rule that forces the legislature to 
explicitly state if they intend to remove a municipality’s zoning 
power. 
In addition, a requirement of express intent for preemption 
would help the judiciary and the legislature. The judiciary will 
no longer have to struggle to discern unclear legislature intent. 
Instead, courts could look at the legislation itself for an explicit 
statement to determine if the state reserved zoning power for 
itself, otherwise local municipalities would retain that authority. 
Government, both on the state and the local level, would also 
benefit. State legislatures going forward would have to truly 
contemplate if the laws they are enacting would be better served 
through local involvement or through laws controlling zoning 
power. This would create an environment conducive to better 
lawmaking. Local governments would also be spared the threat 
of constant litigation based on the intended thoughts of the 
legislature. 
The legality of hydrofracking bans will likely remain 
precarious until the Court of Appeals clarifies the limits of 
implied preemption. In the interim, local municipalities will 
continue to use their zoning power to decide for themselves 
whether the risks of hydrofracking outweigh its rewards. 
                                                          
357 See SALKIN, supra note 177, § 2:01 n.3 (citing Adler v. Deegan, 167 
N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929)). 
